Abstract: This paper deals with traffic rate control problems of networks. The incentive Stackelberg strategy concept was introduced to the networking model that comprises subsidiary systems of users and network. A linear strategy and a nonlinear strategy were proposed to the elastic traffic problem, with the illustrations via examples. The presented method was extended to non-elastic traffic problem.
INTRODUCTION
The work focus on the system model of charging, routing and flow control, where the system comprises both users with utility functions and a network with capacity constraints. Kelly (1997) showed that the optimization of the system may be decomposed into subsidiary optimization problems, one for each user and one for the network, by using price per unit flow as a Lagrange multiplier that mediates between the subsidiary problems. Low and Varaiya (1993) and Murphy et al. (1994) described how such results may be used as the basis for distributed pricing algorithms, and MacKie-Mason and Varian (1994) described a "smart market" based on a per-packet charge when the network is congested.
1 Partially supported by foundation for University Key Teacher by Ministry of Education and foundation for returned scholar abroad by Ministry of Education As mentioned in Kelly's (1997) work, price per unit flow is the mediating variable. And this may cause a particular difficulty for elastic traffic. In an implementation of an ATM available bit rate service, for example, users would be subject to two sources of uncertainty about the service offered. The system optimum can be achieved when users' choice of charges and the network's choice of allocated rates are in equilibrium. For elastic traffic, the equilibrium exists and a system optimum can be achieved. But for most nonelastic traffic, the equilibrium does not exist and the system optimum can not be achieved.
By using the incentive Stackelberg strategy concept, a new way to deal with such kind of routing control problems is proposed. Studies on the game theory and its applications belong to the area of automatic control (Basar and Olsder 1982) . In a game theoretic model (Funderberg and Tirole 1992) , there are at least two players who control their own inputs to reach their own outcomes from the system, respectively. Therefore, game theory (Myerson 1991 ) provides a systematic framework to treat the dynamic behavior of noncooperative networks. Two major concepts in game theory, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, have been employed into the study of noncooperative networks (see Bertsekas and Gallager 1992 , Douligeris and Mazumdar 1989 , Economides and Silvester 1990 , Korilis et al 1996 , Orda et al 1993 . In these references, the game theoretic models are all based on the classical noncooperate strategy concepts.
In this paper, the traffic rate control problem is discussed by means of the incentive Stackelberg strategy, which was introduced into the game theory by Ho et al (1982) . To the elastic traffic, a linear strategy and a nonlinear strategy are proposed to reveal the concept of incentive strategies. The method is generalized to non-elastic traffic model. The incentive strategy consists of two parts one of which is the regular price. The other is punishment price which varies on the variance of traffic rate linearly or functionally.
SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network with a set J of resources, and let C j be the finite capacity of resource j, for j ∈J. A set S of users use the network with rates x s ∈S, s = 1, 2, · · · , S. For each user s, the utility maximization is as follows.
where U s (x s ) is the utility function of user s, and it is an increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable function of x s . λ s is a price charged to user s per unit flow, and also is the component of the vectors of Lagrange multiplies for the following problem of overall system.
SYSTEM(U, H, A, C):
where H and A are the 0−1 matrixes, y is the flow pattern. And the Lagrangian form of the problem is
where z is a vector of slack variables. If the leader wants users be at the rates which is arranged by the network, the leader must have the leadership in the game which is indicated in the following Stackelberg strategy.
where p s (x s ) is any function of x s to be determined. x a s is a desired point arranged by the network. p s (x s ) can be taken as a linear function
where q s is some kind of punishment price. It will be determined by the leader.
INCENTIVE STRATEGY FOR ELASTIC TRAFFIC PROBLEM

Linear Incentive Strategy
In this section, the linear function (6) 
To get q s , calculate the derivative of (7) with respect to x s , and let it be zero. Therefore,
So, the strategy should be
The following work is to prove that (10) is a incentive Stackelberg strategy, i.e.
and
It is easy to see that (11) is held from the structure of ξ s (x s ) in (10). Eq. (12) means that the following inequality should hold.
Now, denote by x u s the optimal rate of user s which maximizes the problem USER s (U s ; λ s ). So
If the optimal rates of users coincide with the arranged rates of the network, i.e. x u s = x a s , the prefer rate of user s is just x a s . Therefore,
So (13) (9) into V s (x s ), and calculating the first and second derivatives of (7) with respect to x s , so
From (17) ) is an increasing function, its optimum must be at the right border of its region, if it has a finite region.
Numerical Example and Geometric Illustration
The example from Kelly's (1997) work is used. Suppose that each source-sink s is served by a single route r, and abbreviate notation by writing s = r = 1, rather than s = {r}; thus H = I, the identity matrix. Suppose also that U s (x s ) = m s log x s . Let the finite capacity is C = 10. Then λ s = m s /10. for some reason, the incentive strategy should be taken. Figure 5 from which one can see the optimal point clearly. In Figure 5 , the set of curves is the contour of the function for user s in problem USER s (U s ; λ s ) and the line with tangent q s = 1/18 is the incentive strategy. One can see that the maximal value of the function of the user along this line is got at x s = x a s = 6 where is the tangent point of the line and the contour curves. 
Non-linear Incentive Strategy
Choose the function as
It is easy to see that (5) 
It is just the first condition on an incentive strategy in Stackelberg game theory (Basar and Olsder 1982) . To meet the second condition, substitute (5) into (1) (20) where
Consider it in both cases of incentive strategy. But the linear strategy is easier to be realized than the nonlinear one.
INCENTIVE STRATEGY FOR NON-ELASTIC TRAFFIC PROBLEMS
In previous sections, the users' utilities U s (x s ) have an increasing character. By the assumption, one can easily determine the optimum of problem USER s (U s ; λ s ) and/or SYSTEM(U, H, A, C).
However, in a practical network, the delay can be faced very often. The more the traffic rate is closed to the capacity of resources, the higher the delay will be. Therefore, the utility function can not be always increasing. In this section, the utility function U s (x s ) is concave but no longer be increasing. In such conditions, the parameter λ s in problem USER s (U s ; λ s ) can not be the Lagrange multiplies of problem SYSTEM(U, H, A, C), because it is possible that the optimum of problem SYSTEM(U, H, A, C) can be got in the inner of the set X. X = {(x, y) | Hy = x, Ay ≤ C, x, y ≥ 0} (23) As known, the lagrange multipies of such problem should be zero and can not be taken as the price for per unit flow.
So λ s > 0 must be considered now as a regular price determined by the network. Assume that x * s is the optimal rate for problem SYSTEM (U, H, A, C 
By the following steps, one can determine what q s should be.
i) Calculate the derivative of (24) with respect to x s , and let it be zero, i.e.
ii) Let x s take the value at x * s . So
It can be easily shown that it is an incentive Stackelberg strategy under the condition
Eq. (27) means that the regular price should be determined in a reasonable range.
To illustrate the result, let
The example is just the extension of that in (?). 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the traffic rate control problem for a kind of network systems is discussed. The networking models based on elastic and nonelastic traffic are considered and the valid incentive Stackelberg strategies are proposed. It is a quite new way that the networking traffic control problem is dealt with by using the tool of game theory.
